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1.  Introduction 
In recent years, a large body of the international literature as well as the policy debate have 
expressed increasing interest in measures to mitigate the negative externalities of climate 
change policies. As a matter of fact, the imposition of stringent climate policies may produce 
substantially distortive effects in terms of displacement and re-allocation of carbon intensive 
production processes in countries where no climate policies are in force, a phenomenon also 
known as carbon leakage effect (OECD, 2006). However, the extent of carbon leakage is 
controversial and there is considerable debate on the design of the correct policy mix to 
reduce it. 
Generally speaking, the potential outcome of unilateral climate change policies may be a 
reduction in carbon emissions of abating countries partially undermined by an increase in 
carbon emissions by non-compliant countries. This negative outcome may be explained by 
relative  changes  in  the  comparative  advantages  between  non-compliant  and  abating 
countries, whose climate policies will reduce competitiveness of domestic firms with respect 
to foreign production. Consequently, some forms of border adjustments have been invoked 
in  order  to  restore  a  level  playing  field  between  domestic  producers  facing  abatement 
policies (e.g., carbon tax or emission trading) and foreign exporters subject to a carbon tariff 
(Moore, 2010; Wooders and Cosbey, 2010). 
The  jury  is  still  out  on  the  exact  design  and  practical  implementation  of  these 
adjustments, since there are several unresolved issues. In this respect, we will elaborate on 
the existing studies providing further evidence about the extent of carbon leakage and the 
impact of different forms of Carbon Border Tax (CBT). However, the major focus of the 
paper is on the ambiguities regarding the possible goal(s) to be achieved through a CBT. As 
a matter of fact, carbon tariffs are often justified both as instruments to reduce the leakage 
rate or to restore the competitiveness of domestic firms: our results show that the two goals 
are not necessarily overlapping. 
In order to quantify in a more realistic way how CBTs influence emission behaviours of 
non-compliant  countries  we  develop  a  modified  version  of  the  computable  general 
equilibrium GTAP-E model (Burniaux and Truong, 2002; McDougall and Golub, 2007) in 
order  to  assess  the  potential  economic  and  carbon  emissions  effects  related  to  CBT 
adjustment schemes. We refer to the Kyoto objectives as our climate policy framework, to be 
able to depict a world where two groups exist, abating and non abating countries. Our 
regional aggregation includes the 11 Annex I countries/regions featuring country-specific 
CO2 emission reduction commitments listed in the Kyoto Protocol and the largest emerging 
economies within the Non-Annex list, including Brazil, China, India and Mexico, that are  
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expected to be the most likely source of carbon leakage. In terms of sectoral aggregation, we 
distinguish  21  sectors  in  order  to  simulate  the  impact  of  alternative  policies  in  energy 
intensive and non-intensive sectors.  
In order to build a benchmark for investigating the effectiveness of alternative forms of 
CBT,  we  first  assess  the  carbon  leakage  implied  by  an  international  emission  reduction 
agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol, modelling two scenarios with and without emission 
trading. We then compare a cooperative scenario featuring global emission trading where 
Non-Annex  countries  also  play  an  active  role  with  several  approaches  to  deal  with  the 
carbon leakage effect introducing different carbon tariff schemes (hereafter referred to as 
non-cooperative scenarios). 
On  the  one  hand,  in  the  cooperative  scenario  Annex  I  countries  face  their  emission 
targets as defined in the Kyoto agreement whereas Non-Annex countries are constrained to 
a zero-increase in domestic emissions. 
On the other hand, in the non-cooperative scenarios, carbon tariffs are either based on the 
domestic carbon tax or endogenously computed as ad valorem equivalents. In the former 
case, a specific carbon tariff is computed by multiplying the carbon tax either by the actual 
carbon content of imports or by the carbon content of the corresponding domestic good. In 
the latter case, the ad valorem tariff equivalent is set either with the aim of eliminating (or at 
least reducing) the carbon leakage or with the aim of keeping the competitiveness of Annex I 
countries in satisfying their domestic demand. 
By applying the exogenously given CBT based on the domestic carbon tax, we assess the 
economic impacts of the unilateral policies that are currently discussed in the political debate 
especially in the European Union. The effects produced by an exogenous carbon tariff on 
competitiveness, welfare changes and emission levels of Non-Annex countries are compared 
with those resulting from ‘endogenous tariffs’ (i.e., tariffs computed in order to achieve a 
given objective either in terms of leakage or competitiveness). The distance between the 
exogenous  and  the  endogenous  carbon  tariffs  gives  an  idea  of  the  distance  between  the 
policy schemes actually discussed and the motivations put forward by the proponents of 
these policies. 
The  economic  and  environmental  effects  resulting  from  alternative  policies  applied 
unilaterally by Annex I countries are compared with the results from the cooperative - or 
zero-leakage  -  scenario.  Such  a  comparison  highlights  the  advantage  for  Non-Annex 
countries of changing their conservative position in the climate negotiations. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a literature review 
on carbon leakage and border adjustments. In Section 3 we describe the computable general  
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equilibrium model, the 2012 baseline and the non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios. In 
Section 4 we present the main simulation results and Section 5 provides some final remarks. 
 
 
2.  The carbon leakage issue 
2.1  The measurement of carbon leakage  
A global solution to  climate change has not been implemented yet, since the output of 
Copenhagen meeting in 2009 was a non-binding agreement. Cancùn negotiations in 2010 
represented  a  step  forward  for  reaching  a  cooperative  solution,  but  global  international 
cooperation for fighting climate change still seems a difficult goal to be achieved. For this 
reason,  policy  actions  to  mitigate  climate  change  and  reduce  emissions  still  remain 
unilateral. It has already been noted that the efficiency of CO2 reduction policies could be 
undermined  by  the  presence  of  carbon  leakage  (Hamasaki,  2007).  The  use  of  economic 
instruments for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction with a non-global approach is 
likely  to  have  negative  impacts  on  the  international  competitiveness  of  some  industrial 
sectors, for example, the steel and the cement sectors (OECD, 2003, 2005). If only a few 
countries  are  involved  in  the  implementation  of  climate  change  policies,  non-abating 
countries may have comparative advantages in producing and exporting energy intensive 
goods, risking to nullify the efforts of abating countries. Veenendaal and Manders (2008), for 
instance, point out that if a coalition of countries committing themselves to reducing GHG 
emissions remains limited in its coverage, carbon leakage is likely to occur, partly offsetting 
the reduction efforts made by the coalition. The vast and growing literature on this issue 
distinguishes two typologies of leakage: the first one is caused by a shift in the location of 
production towards non-compliant regions and the second one is related to an increase in 
energy  consumption  in  non-abating  regions  due  to  the  lower  prices  resulting  from  the 
reduced demand for fossil fuels on the international markets by abating countries. 
Imposing  stringent  climate  policies  in  certain  countries  may  produce  substantially 
distortive effects in terms of displacement and  development of carbon intensive production 
processes  in  countries  where  no  climate  policies  are  in  action,  in  a  well  consolidated 
literature  strand  referring  to  the  so-called  pollution  haven  effect  (Copeland  and  Taylor, 
2004).  The  pollution  haven  hypothesis  explains  the  first  type  of  leakage  where 
carbon/energy intensive firms will move from abating countries to non-abating countries in 
order to exploit relative comparative advantages arising from heterogeneous environmental 
standards.  
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Carbon leakage due to production relocation is related to the fact that leakage increases 
with the intensity of international competition in energy-intensive goods. If this competition 
is  strong  and  energy  intensive  goods  are  perfectly  substitutable  in  terms  of  production 
location, this will bring production of carbon intensive goods to countries with lower energy 
costs. In other words, when countries have different environmental regulatory stringency, 
production will be located where environmental costs are lower. As emphasized by Babiker 
(2005), in extreme situations where energy-intensive goods produced in different countries 
are perfectly homogeneous, the relocation of the production of carbon intensive goods to 
non-abating countries is almost complete, leading to carbon leakage rates that can even 
exceed 100%. 
In addition to the leakage resulting from a shift in production location, a second type of 
leakage could result from a substitution effect induced by decreasing carbon-energy demand 
in the abating countries and the consequent fall in international energy prices (Gerlagh and 
Kuik, 2007). This second type of carbon leakage can be explained by referring to the energy 
market model: the reduction in fossil fuel demand in abating countries leads to lower prices 
on the world energy markets, which in turn fosters energy demand in non-abating countries 
(Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2000; Felder and Ruherford, 1993). As a matter of fact, the 
relative magnitude of the taxing countries’ energy demand combined with the elasticity of 
the energy supply curve are key drivers in determining different types of leakage (Kuik and 
Gerlagh, 2003). According to Gerlagh and Kuik (2007), the energy market model seems to 
be the prevalent explanation of carbon leakage estimates from simulation analyses.2 
The rate of carbon leakage is usually computed as the ratio between the increase of CO2 
emissions  in  non-abating  countries  and  the  reduction  of  CO2  emissions  in  countries 
implementing GHG abatement policies. As reported by the Energy Modeling Forum (2000) 
and Kuik and Verbruggen (2002), carbon leakage rates vary widely according to the model 
used: 5% (GREEN), 8% (G-Cubed), 9% (GTEM), 11% (Gemini-E3), 14% (WorldScan), 26% 
(MS-MRT), 34% (MERGE4). 
In addition to these macro leakage rates, sectoral leakage rates can be computed as the 
ratio of the additional emissions in each productive sector of Non-Annex I countries to the 
emission reduction achieved in Annex I countries in the same sector (Kuik and Ofkes, 2010). 
Sectoral  rates  are  useful  for  understanding  which  sectors  are  most  responsible  for  the 
leakage rate and which  should consequently be targeted by specific trade policy measures. 
Even if the implications for international trade of emission abatement policies are crucial, 
                                                 
2 It is also worth noting that this is likely to be the main available mechanism in all models where only a partial 
international reallocation of factor endowments is allowed, such as the static GTAP-E used in this paper.! 
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especially when considering their acceptability and feasibility, few studies have adopted a 
global  approach  and  tried  to  quantify  simultaneously  the  effects  on  emissions,  sectoral 
exports and output of all countries, as well as distributional welfare effects at country level. 
Babiker and Jacoby (1999) use the EPPA-GTAP model and find a global leakage rate of 
6%: 30% of the leakage is related to China alone and more than 60% to only five countries: 
Brazil,  China,  India,  Mexico  and  South  Korea.  McKibbin  et  al.  (1999)  use  the  G-Cubed 
general equilibrium model and focus on the effects of the tradable emissions permit system 
proposed in the Kyoto Protocol on international trade and capital flows. Their results show 
a significant carbon leakage effect. Initially, over half of this leakage is due to the lower oil 
demand  from  Annex  I  countries,  and  in  particular  from  the  US,  and  the  fact  that  non-
abating  countries  buy  and  burn  more  oil.  In  the  long  run,  it  is  economic  growth  that 
produces most of the increase in Non-Annex emissions. 
In the analysis developed by Haaparanta et al. (2001) using a modified GTAP-E version, 
the leakage rate also decreases when emission permit trading is allowed between Annex I 
countries compared to the case where Kyoto targets are only introduced on a national basis. 
This result is mainly due to the crucial role played by the Former Soviet Union (FSU), 
where emissions increase by 3.2% in the scenario with domestic implementation whereas 
with emission permit trading, they are dramatically reduced by almost 60%. Among the 
factors that potentially affect carbon leakage, little attention has been paid to changes in 
import tariffs. Kuik and Verbruggen (2002) compare a scenario where emissions of Annex I 
are constrained to the Kyoto objectives with no change in import tariffs and a similar one in 
which tariffs are adjusted to implement the Uruguay Round and find that the leakage rate 
increases with trade liberalization. 
Carbon leakage estimates seem to be very sensitive to different model settings. Two key 
parameters  emerge  as  the  driving  factors  of  highly  heterogeneous  leakage  rates:  the 
Armington elasticities in the import demand module and the substitution elasticities in the 
energy nests of the production module (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007). In particular, if lower 
Armington elasticities values are assumed, there will be fewer opportunities for Non-Annex 
countries  to  expand  their  exports  towards  compliant  countries  thus  resulting  in  lower 
leakage (McKibbin et al.,1999). Moreover, as a consequence of price impacts of emission 
reduction targets, non-abating countries will import less carbon-intensive commodities from 
Annex I countries due to changes in their comparative advantages. At the same time, given a 
certain value of Armington elasticities, non-abating countries will easily substitute imported 
intermediates from Annex I countries with intermediates from other non-abating countries 
and substitute aggregate imports with domestic intermediates (Wang et al., 2009) eventually  
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producing a demand-driven leakage effect. In this respect, higher substitution elasticities in 
the production function between energy and other inputs, as well as between alternative 
fossil fuels, would lead to larger drops in world energy price and hence to larger leakage 
rates (Kuik, 2001). 
 
 
2.2  Alternative carbon border tax designs 
Positive analysis on the existence and potential causes of the carbon leakage effect paved the 
way for a growing strand of literature dealing with policies that could solve the problem. 
We can provide a real-world example: European energy-intensive sectors, facing a price for 
carbon emissions, could be at a competitive disadvantage compared with regions with a less 
stringent, or inexistent, climate policy, and they are exposed to negative effects in terms of 
loss  of  production  and  jobs.  CBTs  could  then  be  introduced  with  the  aim  of  restoring 
competitive fairness and preventing carbon leakage. 
Abating countries may decide to impose two forms of CBT: full or partial adjustment. 
Full adjustment refers to a carbon tariff (in other words, a carbon border tax) applied to 
imported goods from non-compliant countries plus a tax rebate for domestic goods which 
are exported.3 Partial adjustment refers to the application of border carbon tariffs without 
rebates on exports (Fischer and Fox, 2009). For example, in the European Union (EU), since 
it is a net exporter of energy-intensive products, a refund on exports is a more effective 
means of supporting employment in sectors covered by the Emission Trading System (ETS) 
than a levy on imports (Veenendaal and Manders, 2008). 
There is growing concern over CBT as a feasible and effective unilateral policy measure 
for preventing carbon leakage. In particular, three major issues arise from the international 
literature. The first issue is how to design a CBT which is consistent with WTO rules, 
feasible  in  its  implementation,  and  fair  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  heterogeneous 
exporting countries facing the carbon tariff. Relative to this, there is an open debate on the 
possibility of designing CBT adjustments consistent with WTO rules, since trade measures 
might  contravene  WTO’s  Article  I  on  most-favoured  nation  treatment.  The  question  is 
whether tons of carbon from domestic or international sources should be treated in the same 
way and whether goods are subject to similar treatment. On the other hand, based on Article 
XX of the WTO dealing with environmental issues, the absence of a carbon policy in non-
abating countries could be considered an implicit production and export subsidy by abating 
countries (Dong and Whalley, 2008). Because of the legal uncertainty, a CBT regime will be 
                                                 
3 In the rest of the paper, the terms “carbon tariff” or “carbon border tax” will be used interchangeably.! 
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controversial  and  probably  lead  to  a  number  of  disputes  between  WTO  countries 
(Messerlin, 2010; Moore, 2010; Wooders and Cosbey, 2010), but we will not be dealing with 
this issue in this paper. 
More importantly, against the expected benefits of a CBT, there are at least two expected 
costs of border adjustments. First, there is a risk that the border adjustment system could be 
abused for purely protectionist reasons by compliant countries, and second, there is a real 
risk that border adjustments could lead to retaliatory tit-for-tat trade wars, particularly with 
developing nations who may believe that developed nations bear a greater responsibility for 
curbing climate change (Bordoff, 2008). 
While the vast majority of scientific and political documents agree on the value of the 
specific tariff which should be taken as equivalent to the specific carbon price in the abating 
countries (i.e., equal to the domestic carbon tax or to the net equilibrium permits price if an 
emissions trading scheme is allowed), there are different opinions about how to quantify the 
embedded  carbon  in  traded  goods  from  non-compliant  countries.  Two  alternative 
computation methods are often proposed (Elliot et al., 2010a). The first one is to apply a best 
available technology (BAT) approach in the importing country. In this case, the carbon 
content for each good produced in the compliant countries is applied to imported goods 
coming from non-abating economies. The second one considers the effective carbon content 
of the imported goods, thus relying on the production technique applied by the producing 
country. This second method could introduce a high degree of uncertainty for exporting 
countries and lead to a heterogeneous treatment and a relative penalty for less developed 
economies. According to Ismer and Neuhoff (2007), the CBT based on the carbon content of 
the imported good as if it would be produced with the BAT in the levying country seems to 
be the only trade measure that should be WTO compatible. Moreover, the two computation 
methods may be applied twofold: if a direct approach is considered, only carbon emissions 
related to the production process are accounted for. If an indirect accounting approach is 
implemented, all CO2 emissions related to the production process of all intermediates are 
considered for the application of the CBT, leading to substantially higher implementation 
difficulties.4  Choosing  the  indirect  emission  accounting  approach  strongly  affects  carbon 
leakage estimates. Atkinson et al. (2010) analyse the total embodied carbon emissions in 
goods produced and consumed by different countries, combining the GTAP model with both 
the  Bilateral  Trade  Input-Output  (BTIO)  and  Multi-Region  Input-Output  (MRIO) 
approaches. They find that the carbon tariff equivalent to a carbon price of 50$ per ton of 
                                                 
4 Despite the indirect emissions approach seems to be the most promising from an environmental point of view, 
it should bring to high implementation costs at the administrative level.! 
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CO2 amounts to 10% of the value of the average export bundle of non-abating countries, but 
tariffs may be two to three times higher for specific sectors. This suggests that CBTs – 
when  also  indirect  emissions  are  considered  –  present  an  higher  risk  of  being  trade 
distorting and being associated with losses in efficiency and welfare, particularly in low and 
middle income countries. 
The second question concerns the effectiveness of CBT in preventing carbon leakage 
(Schenker and Bucher, 2010). As a matter of fact, empirical analyses provide contrasting 
results on the effective capacity of CBTs to reduce emissions from non-abating countries, 
depending both on model settings and alternative CBT designs. For example, Mattoo et al. 
(2009) show that carbon leakage is a very limited phenomenon, while introducing a CBT 
based  on  the  carbon  content  of  imports  would  seriously  damage  Non-Annex  trading 
partners. Such an action would impose average tariffs on merchandise imports from India 
and China of over 20 percent and would lower manufacturing exports of these countries 
towards Annex I by between 16 and 21 percent. On the contrary, Dong and Whalley (2009) 
simulate CBTs based on the emissions generated by comparable domestic production in the 
importing country (BAT approach). In this case CBTs effects are generally small, depending 
on the emission targets of abating countries, and CBTs contribute to alleviating the carbon 
leakage effects. 
Adopting a sector-based approach, the picture of the effectiveness of CBTs becomes even 
more complex. Kuik and Hofkes (2010) explore the implications of CBTs on the EU ETS, 
distinguishing  between  sectoral  and  macro  rate  of  leakage.  In  this  case,  CBTs  impose 
significant reductions in sectoral leakage rates and more modest ones in the macro leakage 
rate. This is due to the fact that CBTs preserve sectoral competitiveness in abating countries 
but do not directly affect the emissions increase by non-compliant countries driven by the 
fall in energy prices and the substitution effect which accounts for the largest part of the 
macro rate of leakage. At the general level, empirical contributions find that CBTs are not 
very effective from an environmental point of view. 
A third issue relates to welfare implications of a CBT approach. The degree of political 
acceptance of a policy is very likely to depend on its perceived “fairness” in terms of welfare 
changes  for  the  different  economic  agents  or  countries  affected  by  its  implementation 
(OECD,  2006).  It  is  worth  noting  that  CBTs  clearly  represent  a  second  best  solution 
compared with the implementation of global climate policies which would establish a similar 
carbon price for all countries (Stern, 2006).!
 
  
  10 
3.  Model and Scenario Setting 
3.1  Model description 
The Computable General Equilibrium GTAP-E model is an energy-environmental version 
of the standard GTAP model specifically designed to simulate GHG emissions mitigation 
policies. It includes an explicit treatment of energy demand, the possibility of inter-factor 
and  inter-fuel  substitution,  information  on  carbon  dioxide  emissions  accounting  and  the 
possibility of introducing market-based policy instruments such as carbon taxes or emissions 
trading (Burniaux and Truong, 2002; McDougall and Golub, 2007). 
As far as the production structure is concerned, GTAP-E adds several substitution nests 
such as between a capital-energy composite and other production factors or between capital 
and a energy-composite where the latter is obtained by substitution across different energy 
commodities. 
Carbon taxation is modelled with different tax wedges for firms, private and government 
consumption of domestic and imported energy products. An international emissions trading 
(IET) scheme, as described in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, is modelled by defining bloc-
level emissions and emissions quotas in the abating (Annex I) countries. Carbon dioxide 
emission permits can be traded in an international market where only compliant countries 
are allowed to to buy or sell permits. Accordingly, once Kyoto targets for each Annex I 
country are established, the model computes the carbon tax required to reach the emission 
reduction objectives. The carbon tax represents the marginal cost of abatement equalized 
between regions that participate in IET and at equilibrium coincides with the permits price. 
If emission trade is not allowed, the carbon tax represents the domestic cost of abatement in 
each Annex I country. If we consider the GTAP-E structure, the carbon tax reduces CO2 
emissions by augmenting the cost of fossil fuels as inputs in the production and consumption 
functions (for firms and private households, respectively). 
In  this  paper,  we  introduce  some  changes  in  the  GTAP-E  model.  First  of  all,  some 
substitution  elasticities  -  namely  the  substitution  elasticity  between  the  capital-energy 
composite and the other endowments and the substitution elasticity between capital and 
energy in all the nests related to the energy composite - were replaced with those proposed 
by Beckman and Hertel (2010). The Armington elasticities were also changed as in Hertel et 
al. (2007).5 This specific choice allows a better assessment of carbon leakage implications 
since the literature agrees on the crucial role of substitution elasticities in the quantification 
                                                 
5 For a comprehensive discussion on substitution elasticities in the energy sector, see Koetse et al. (2008), 
Okagawa and Ban (2008), while Panagarya et al. (2001) and Welsch (2008) discuss the role of import demand 
elasticities in international trade.! 
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and geographical distribution of leakage rates. 
A second set of changes refers to the data. We updated the GTAP-E dataset using the 
latest version of the GTAP Database version 7.1 (base year 2004) as well as the latest 
version of the combustion-based CO2 emissions data provided by Lee (2008) for all GTAP 
sectors and regions. It is worth mentioning that we introduced some adjustments to specific 
sectors and regions where emissions were not consistent with data provided by the main 
international energy agencies (EIA-DOE and IEA). Since CO2 emissions data are assigned 
to each region/sector on the basis of energy input volumes and emission intensity factors, 
we analysed country/sector specific data in order to understand which factors were driving 
these  distortions  the  most.  We  found  that  for  some  sectors  and  regions  the  emission 
intensity  factors  were  indeed  much  higher  than  the  average  leading  to  a  substantial 
overestimation of the corresponding emissions reported in the official IEA data on CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels combustion. In order to reduce this bias, we replaced the emission 
intensity factors for those sectors and regions whose values were out of the range -1/+1 
compared with the official IPCC emission intensity factors (Herold, 2003). On the basis of 
these new emission intensity factors, we computed adjusted CO2 emissions, obtaining new 
values for those sectors/regions characterized by outlier emission factors. 
In order to include CO2 emissions in the GTAP-E model, some preliminary changes had 
to  be  made  to  adapt  data  to  model  requirements.  Since  the  most  recent  CO2  emissions 
database  do  not  distinguish  between  domestic  or  imported  sources,  we  computed  these 
shares  as  proportional  to  the  volumes  of  domestic  production  and  imports,  respectively. 
Such a choice is consistent with the methodological assumptions described in Ludena (2007) 
and Lee (2008) where CO2 emissions data are calculated from the energy volume data of the 
GTAP Version 6 database.6 It is worth noticing that emissions in our version could not 
account for all other GHG emissions since they only relate to fossil fuels combustion, thus 
providing a lower bound estimate of total emissions and abatement targets. Even if the 
missing emissions amount to 15% of total GHG, the underestimation is quite homogeneous 
across regions and sectors with the exception of the agricultural and chemical sectors, thus 
not influencing the distributive effects of our simulations. 
Finally, CO2 emissions are directly linked to the energy commodities considered in the 
model such as coal, crude oil, natural gas, refined oil products and gas manufacture and 
distribution. CO2 emissions are produced by energy consumption by firms, government and 
private households. These direct emissions are taxed without discriminating between the 
                                                 
6 Following Mc Dougall and Golub (2007) and Ludena (2007) we converted emissions data from Ggcos’è? of 
CO2, as they were expressed in Lee (2008), into million tons of carbon.! 
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source of the energy products. In these sectors, domestic and imported goods are treated 
alike and there are no grounds for fearing either carbon leakage or competitive disadvantage 
of national firms. As a consequence, all the CBTs described in Section 3.3 only apply to the 
sectors  where  fossil  energy  sources  are  burnt  producing  direct  emissions  (i.e.  emissions 
deriving from the use of energy commodities as intermediate inputs). Indirect emissions, 
linked to the use of non energy intermediate inputs, whose production implied burning fossil 
energy sources and CO2 emissions, are not taken into account. 
 
 
3.2  Model setting and baseline 
In order to simulate different scenarios in the context of an international agreement for the 
reduction of CO2 emission we decided to hypothesize the implementation of the abatement 
targets of the Kyoto Protocol. To this purpose, an aggregation of 21 sectors and 21 regions 
was chosen (Table 1). 
 
Table 1- Regional and Sector aggregation 
 
 
With regard to regional aggregation, we consider a “Post-Kyoto” environment, with 11 
Annex  I  countries/regions  featuring  country-specific  CO2  reduction  commitments. 
Moreover, in our disaggregation we single out the major emerging economies, including 
Brazil, China and India, since they may be the source of alleged carbon leakage. According 
to  Babiker  and  Jacoby  (1999),  for  instance,  China,  India,  Brazil  plus  South  Korea  and 
Mexico, account for 60% of global leakage. As far as sectoral aggregation is concerned, in  
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addition  to  the  energy  sectors  such  as  coal,  crude  oil,  gas,7  refined  oil  products  and 
electricity, we singled out energy intensive sectors (e.g., cement, paper, steel and aluminium) 
that are expected to be the main sources of carbon leakage. 
A 2012 baseline was created based on the GTAP 7.1 database and using 2004 data. To 
this  end,  we  build  a  business  as  a  usual  scenario  for  emissions  data    assuming  a  slow 
adoption of clean technologies and economic projections to 2012 based on IMF and World 
Bank data on actual growth rates after the financial and economic crisis. Several steps were 
necessary  to  obtain  a  convincing 2012  baseline.  We  first  updated  the  database  to  2008, 
assuming population and gross domestic product as reported by the World Bank and IMF 
data8 and calibrating the emissions to the most recent IEA CO2 data (IEA, 2010). The same 
procedure was adopted to bring the model to 2012. In both cases, while the emissions level 
in aggregate was correct, its distribution in terms of emissions quota among regions was not 
satisfactory. As a consequence, in the 2008 baseline, we corrected CO2 emissions to fit the 
IEA data while in the 2012 baseline, we calibrated the CO2 emissions to the IEA projections 
(IEA, 2010b).9 
The carbon emissions in the baseline from 2004 to 2008 computed in our version of the 
GTAP-E model, which includes the changes in emission intensity factors and substitution 
elasticities,  are  much  more  consistent  with  those  provided  by  international  IEA.  The 
improvement  obtained  is  quite  substantial  since  the  standard  GTAP-E  model  provides 
aggregate results that in some cases are at odds with current data. As a consequence, we are 
confident that our specification is able to provide a more accurate assessment of the potential 
extent of carbon leakage.10 
As a final remark, we would like to mention that CO2 emissions in the GTAP-E model, 
as well as the IEA data, refer to fossil fuels emissions only, excluding all other possible CO2 
equivalent emission sources. As a consequence, we recomputed the 1990 emission levels in 
order  to  get  consistent  CO2  emission  targets  in  the  implementation  of  Kyoto  Protocol 
commitments.11 Even if our ultimate goal is not to provide realistic CO2 projections but to 
                                                 
7 The gas sector in the present aggregation includes the sector of natural gas extraction and gas manufacture 
and distribution.!
8!In order to treat regional GDP as an exogenous variable and to shock it, regional technological progress was 
taken as an endogenous variable.!
9 Emissions have been swapped with technical progress using a specific closure (Altertax) that allows some 
data to be changed preserving the overall consistency of the model.!
10 Robustness checks for model results to different parameters have been addressed by a sensitivity analysis 
where standard deviation from results in our version is rather small. More importantly, we have also found 
that relying on original GTAP 7.1 substitution elasticities, carbon leakage would result into overestimated 
values,  especially  due  to  substitution  elasticity  between  capital  and  energy  in  the  first  nest  under  the 
production function.!
11 In order to make emission levels in GTAP-E model as consistent as possible with those considered for the 
Kyoto  targets  by  official  IPCC  documents,  we  first  calculated  the  deviation  between  GTAP-E  and  IPCC  
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compare the economic effects of alternative policy scenarios, it is worth emphasizing that 
Annex I emissions in our baseline are almost identical to those proposed by IEA (2010b) and 
reported in the most recent European Environmental Agency Report (EEA, 2010). 
 
 
3.3  Scenario Setting 
The rate of carbon leakage is defined as the increase in CO2 emissions in the rest of the 
world induced by the domestic reduction measures as a percentage share of the absolute 
value of the volume of CO2 reduction obtained by compliant countries (Kuik and Ofkes, 
2009).  Then,  we  first  check  the  existence  of  carbon  leakage  in  a  pure  Kyoto  Protocol 
scenario, where we impose reduction targets on all Annex I countries with respect to their 
1990 emission levels, as if also the United States ratified the Protocol. 
We assess the existence of carbon leakage both allowing for the possibility of emission 
trading among Annex I countries (KT scenario) and only implementing domestic measures 
(KNT scenario).12 Since results show that emission trading is going to be a more efficient 
policy instrument in terms of compliance costs for abating countries and consequently more 
convenient in welfare terms at the global level (as explained in details in the results), all the 
following  simulations  assume  that  the  Kyoto  Protocol  is  implemented  by  allowing  for 
emission trading (Figure 1). 
When simulating emission targets, some corrective measures should be adopted since the 
emission permits potentially supplied by transition economies (the FSU and Belarus in our 
model) to the carbon market are substantially higher than permits demanded by the other 
Annex  I  countries,  resulting  in  a  close-to-zero  carbon  price.  Such  uncertainties  may  be 
included in the so-called ‘hot air’ debate which also addresses the role of the other flexible 
mechanisms required by the Protocol (World Bank, 2010). In order to avoid these extreme 
outcomes, we adjusted, albeit partially, the emission targets for Belarus and the FSU. For 
these countries, the emission levels in 2012 represent the reference to which the 0% target 
scheduled in the Protocol should be applied, rather than the usual 1990 period, substantially 
reducing the permits supply. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
emissions data in 2004 and then we proportionally changed the 1990 IPCC emissions data in order to calculate 
the effective abatement efforts required by the achievement of the Kyoto Protocol targets.!
"#!In this paper, we follow a standard assumption in the literature using applied general equilibrium models, 
namely that all abating policies may be expressed in monetary values by computing a domestic carbon tax 
applied to fossil fuels consumption. When we assume the existence of an emission trading system, the carbon 
tax at equilibrium equals the permits price. We are aware of the existence of  more complex policy schemes 
adopted in many countries, but for the aim of this paper we are only concerned with the relative incidence of 
the compliance costs with respect to different countries and not to different environmental policies.! 
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Figure 1 – Simulation design 
 
The fact that only some countries, namely the ones in Annex I, contribute to a global 
common goal such as the avoidance of climate change is already quite controversial. The 
very fact that the efforts made by a group of countries may be undermined, even partially, by 
the  behaviour  of  other  countries  cast  serious  doubts  on  the  political  feasibility  of 
international negotiations inspired by the Kyoto Protocol agreement. Since domestic firms, 
especially in the energy intensive sectors, are going to be hurt by carbon taxes introduced to 
meet  the  abatement  targets,  several  governments  are  considering  introducing  taxes  on 
imports from countries that have not introduced climate change policies so far. 
Border tax adjustments could be ‘two-way’ if they were also applied to products exported 
to Non-Annex countries as is customary in differences in indirect taxes (e.g., the value added 
tax)  between  trading  partners.  However,  such  an  export  rebate  would  provide  obvious 
incentives to keep ‘dirty’ plants operating for export purposes and this would make it even 
more difficult for other firms to meet the abatement commitments (Fisher and Fox, 2009). 
Consequently, our scenarios are based on ‘one-way’ CBTs, applied to all imported goods that 
did not pay for the emissions implied by their production.13 
The alternative strategies envisaged in order to cope with carbon leakage usually assume 
that carbon tax is extended to imported goods from Non-Annex countries either on the basis 
of the carbon intensity of domestic production or on the basis of the emission intensity in the 
exporting  country.  In  order  to  assess  the  impacts  of  these  implementation  choices,  we 
                                                 
13 Since in the GTAP-E structure carbon tax is levied on all energy commodities, produced domestically or 
abroad, carbon tariff is not applied to imported energy commodities, otherwise a double counting problem will 
arise.!
Figure 1   Simulation design 
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simulate additional counterfactual scenarios not related to the current political debate. In 
these  scenarios,  carbon  tariffs  are  endogenously  determined  in  order  to  achieve  some 
predetermined  goals  such  as  the  elimination  of  carbon  leakage  or  the  preservation  of 
domestic firms’ competitiveness. 
Since we allow for emission trading, CBT scenarios extending the carbon tax to imports 
(KT-TCCNK and KT-TCC) are based on a single price for carbon emission, but border 
taxes are going to differ by sector according to the carbon contents (Bordoff, 2008). In the 
KT-TCCNK scenario, border taxes are based on the carbon content of imported goods 
whereas in the KT-TCC scenario, they are based on the carbon content of the corresponding 
domestic production in the importing country according to a BTA approach. In the latter 
case, all Non-Annex countries face the same (specific) border taxes on their exports to each 
Annex I country whereas in the former case, all Annex I countries adopt the same policy 
implying different (specific) taxes for the same good according to the country of origin. 
The KT-TCCNK scenario is likely to be deemed inconsistent with WTO provisions since 
it discriminates between Non-Annex countries as well as between domestic and imported 
products that are going to face different carbon taxes. The KT-TCC scenario avoids these 
discriminations and it is certainly much more realistic in terms of information requirements, 
but it should be noted that the ad valorem equivalent of the tax differs according to the 
bilateral flows unit values so that we may well expect exporters of low quality goods to be 
worse off. CBTs, as a matter of fact, are established in specific terms (i.e., price per ton of 
emissions associated with the production of each good), and it is well-known that specific 
tariffs translates into higher ad valorem equivalents for goods featuring lower prices. 
These scenarios are close to the current political debate, especially in the EU, where a 
non-distorting trade measure which can be designed as the difference between production 
costs before and after the imposition of a carbon tax is the same, in absolute terms, in both 
Annex I countries and elsewhere. All imports by Annex I countries then face the same price 
difference when they enter the foreign markets. 
By comparing the performance of these two approaches for CBT implementation in terms 
of  efficiency  and  effectiveness  in  reducing  carbon  leakage,  we  join  a  large  and  quickly 
growing literature. The most innovative part of the paper adds to these somewhat standard 
scenarios, where the carbon tariff is exogenously set according to the tax resulting from the 
implementation  of  the  abatement  targets,  other  simulations  where  carbon  tariffs  are 
endogenous. To this end, we start from a given goal, either in terms of carbon leakage or 
competitiveness, and use the model to compute the sector-specific ad valorem tariffs that 
would allow these goals to be reached. The counterfactual sector-specific tariffs are then  
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imposed by Annex I countries on all imports from the Non-Annex countries. Accordingly, 
these  tariff  surcharges  (since  they  are  levied  on  top  of  the  existing  tariff  structure)  are 
uniform across (Annex I) importers and (Non-Annex) exporters. 
The first counterfactual scenario (KT-LEAK) targets carbon leakage, and one may think 
that  an  obvious  goal  would  be  to  keep  the  overall  sectoral  emissions  in  the  exporting 
countries constant. It turns out that such a goal is not feasible. In the model, as well as in 
reality, emissions result from the choices of different agents – governments and households, 
for instance – whereas exports only concern firms: even if we introduce prohibitive tariffs, 
we cannot claim to influence overall emissions by only affecting a tiny share of production 
such as exports. As a consequence, in our simulation, we adopt a closure by swapping the 
tariff with the emissions by the exporting countries’ firms. Such a set-up is already quite 
insightful:  a  carbon  tariff  that  completely  eliminates  carbon  leakage  simply  can  not  be 
implemented, since no tariff can intervene on the energy price fall caused by the decrease on 
Annex  I  countries,  and  then  avoid  the  corresponding  increase  in  Non-Annex  domestic 
demand. 
As far as the competitiveness scenario is concerned (KT-COMP), we first need to define 
what is meant by this elusive term. Given that much of the public debate is supposedly about 
unfair competition, we assume that Annex I countries introduce ad valorem tariffs so that the 
share of imports from Non-Annex I in total production in each sector remains constant. 
All the above simulations have been conceived in a non-cooperative setting where Annex 
I countries adopt unilateral policies in order to cope with the fact that other countries do not 
act  to  keep  their  emissions  under  control.  The  final  scenario  (KT-COOP)  simulates  the 
effects of a cooperative solution where Non-Annex countries do not allow their emissions to 
increase with respect to the 2012 baseline. This would eliminate the leakage problem by 
definition,  since  all  Non-Annex  countries  accept  to  keep  their  overall  emission  levels 
unchanged. Moreover, the introduction of emission trading at world level would represent 
the most efficient way of reaching the emission reduction objectives. Consequently, even if 
we do not necessarily consider this scenario a realistic one, we use it as a benchmark in order 
to assess the relative benefits and costs of the other non-cooperative scenarios. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
We first compare the implementation of the abatement targets with and without an emission 
trading scheme (KT and KNT scenarios). Results reported in Table 2 reveal that, when  
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emission trading is allowed, there is a substantial reallocation in emission reductions. In 
particular, the United States (US) reduce less with respect to their emissions quota whereas 
the EU reduces more. This result is consistent with the expected higher allocative efficiency 
of market-based instruments since larger abatement efforts are associated with countries 
with lower marginal abatement costs. As a consequence the average domestic carbon tax 
level  in  the  KNT  scenario  (39.16  $  per  tCO2)  turns  out  to  be  much  higher  than  the 
equilibrium price for emission permits in the KT scenario (22.92 $ per tCO2). This result is 
hardly surprising if we consider that the EU includes 12 new member states which are 
characterized by substantially lower marginal abatement costs and less stringent abatement 
constraints. The combination of these two elements explains why for the EU as a whole it is 
more  convenient  to  reduce  emissions  below  the  target,  selling  emission  permits  in  the 
international market. As expected, the other potential seller is FSU, given its production 
structure as well as the abundance of fossil fuels endowment (Zhang, 2000, 2001).14 
Both simulations generate carbon leakage, but in the KT scenario, the leakage rate is 
higher than in the no trade scenario. We can explain this result by considering that, despite 
the reduction in energy demand is the same in the KNT and KT scenarios fro Annex I as a 
group  –  since  the  same  overall  emission  reduction  objective  should  be  reached  –  it  is 
allocated  in  a  different  way.  This  implies  that  some  large  economies  with  demanding 
abatement  targets  should  implement  less  structural  adjustments  and  undergo  a  smaller 
contraction, showing higher imports from those non-compliant countries than in the KNT 
scenario. 
At  country  level,  the  Non-Annex  countries  most  responsible  for  carbon  leakage  in 
absolute  terms  are  represented  by  South  Africa,  Rest  of  Europe  and  Energy  exporters 
countries,15 and – to a lesser extent – Brazil, India and China. 
It is worth mentioning that our results are broadly consistent with previous findings, 
such  as,  for  instance,  in  Elliot  et  al.  (2010b),  where  the  percentage  change  in  emissions 
associated to a carbon tax of around 23 US$ per ton of CO2 is in the range of 5-6%, which 
corresponds to our 5.66% world emission reduction in the KT scenario. 
 
                                                 
14 It is worth noticing that in the KNT scenario Belarus and FSU have a zero change constraint to emissions 
level, in order to reduce the potential dimension of a hot air event. As a check, when simulating a KNT 
scenario with no constraints for Belarus and FSU, these two countries behave more consistently with a zero 
constraint  rather  than  with  their  potential  percentage  change  in  a  pure  Kyoto  setting,  corresponding  to 
emissions increase by +0.95% and +1.85% with respect to emissions targets of +73% and +48% for Belarus 
and FSU, respectively.!
15 The Energy exporter group represents countries in which energy resources represent the major asset in 
export flows, as defined by IEA Energy Balances. When Annex I countries apply some abatement strategies, 
the fossil fuels demand at world level decreases, thus inducing Energy exporters to shift their production 
structure towards energy intensive industries and explaining their role in producing carbon leakage.! 
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Table 2 - Emissions, welfare and price effects with and without emission trading 
 
Source: elaborations on model results 
Notes: a Average Carbon Tax for Annex I is computed as a weighted average of national carbon tax rates 
          b The price of permits related to the aggregate Annex I corresponds to the equilibrium international market price 
 
Turning  to  the  welfare  effects  (Table  3),  it  is  worth  noticing  that  there  are  large 
discrepancies  in  single  welfare  components  when  comparing  the  domestic  carbon  tax 
scenario (KNT) with the existence of an emission trading scheme (KT), since two prevailing 
effects may be detected.16 
For countries which are net buyers of carbon permits, there is a substantial improvement 
in the allocative efficiency loss since energy intensive goods may continue to be produced. In 
other  words,  the  domestic  efforts  to  reduce  fossil  fuels  consumption  in  a  pure  domestic 
policy scenario would force the economic system to make heavy structural adjustments in 
the production specialization pattern by relocating production factors across sectors. Net 
buyers pay the permits price for having the possibility to reduce the adjustments required by 
the implementation of the domestic targets whereas the opposite is true for net sellers that 
are compensated, at least partially, for the larger adjustments through the emission trading 
revenue. 
 
                                                 
16 Welfare equivalent variation (EV) in GTAP can be decomposed (Hanslow, 2000; Huff and Hertel, 2000) into 
several  aspects,  mainly  related  to  investment  allocation,  allocative  efficiency  (when  allocation  of  resources 
changes relative to pre-existing distortions), and terms of trade effects (related to changes in export relative to 
import prices).! 
  20 
Table 3 – Welfare decomposition for Annex I countries with or without emission 
trading (US $) 
 
Source: elaborations on model results 
 
Babiker et al. (2004) find that direct gains from trading permits may be outweighed by 
“indirect costs” due to pre-existing distortions and market imperfections. In particular, two 
channels can be traced: an efficiency cost effect of IET (namely an allocative efficiency effect) 
due to the interaction between carbon taxation and pre-existing taxes, and a terms of trade 
effect  if  the  policy  affects  international  prices,  even  in  the  absence  of  other  distortions. 
According to our results, the allocative efficiency effect seems to have the upper hand. 
Since carbon leakage is larger in the KT scenario, from here on, we assume that Annex I 
countries can trade carbon dioxide emission permits as established in the Kyoto Protocol 
even if such a mechanism has not been implemented yet. In Figure 2 we elaborate on some 
results of the KT scenario for the EU and the US by combining changes in the domestic 
output  and changes  in  imports  coming  from  the  Non-Annex  group  at  sector  level with 
respect to the 2012 baseline. The fact that most observations are in the left-hand upper 
quadrant confirms that the reductions in domestic production are often compensated for by a 
surge in imports from non-abating countries. Since these sectors are also chiefly responsible 
for carbon leakage (metal products, chemicals, mineral products), this figure clearly shows 
the relocation of production from Annex I to Non-Annex countries, highlighting the link 
between environmental and competitiveness concerns. 
Let us now turn to the “non-cooperative” scenarios where Non-Annex countries do not 
keep  their  emissions  under  control  and  Annex  I  countries  react  by  adopting  unilateral 
policies. We first compare the results of the two scenarios in which carbon tariffs are based 
on permits equilibrium price for carbon emissions aiming at (re-) establishing a level playing 
field. In the KT-TCCNK scenario, border taxes are based on the carbon content of imported 
goods  whereas  in  the  KT-TCC  scenario,  they  are  based  on  the  carbon  content  of  the  
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corresponding  domestic  production  in  the  importing  country.  Table  4  summarizes  the 
results in terms of carbon dioxide emissions and welfare changes for these two scenarios. As 
a first result, according to Babiker and Rutherford (2005), the introduction of a CBT is 
welfare improving for compliant countries with respect to the no tariff case. 
Figure 2 – Changes in domestic output and imports from Non-Annex countries in KT 
scenario  
 
Source: elaborations on model results 
It is worth noting that the distribution of emission reductions across Annex I countries 
hardly  changes  by  applying  an  exogenous  CBT.  Conversely,  the  introduction  of  tariffs 
strongly  affects  the  geographical  distribution  of  carbon  leakage.  In  particular,  the  KT-
TCCNK scenario, where the carbon content is related to the exporting countries, reveals a 
larger impact in terms of leakage reduction, especially for Energy exporters, South Africa, 
China  and  India.  In  any  case,  the  environmental  effectiveness  of  such  unilateral  policies 
seems to be rather small since, although carbon leakage is uniformly reduced across all Non-
Annex countries, the overall change is trivial (especially in the KT-TCC scenario). 
This result is hardly surprising if we look at the share of emissions related to exports by 
Non-Annex towards Annex I countries (Table 5). The first column includes the amount of 
emissions associated with exports for each Non-Annex countries to the Annex-I group in 
the KT scenario. If we compare these figures with the total amount of emissions produced by 
firms in non-compliant countries (the second column), the share of emissions influenced by 
the CBT is rather low (fourth column), and it is even lower if we compare it with total Non-
Annex emissions (third and last columns). In terms of welfare effects, CBTs improve the 
terms of trade for Annex I countries while Non-Annex countries register a corresponding  
  22 
loss, resulting in a pure redistribution of unilateral climate change policies costs, without 
substantial gains in environmental terms. 
 
Table 4 – Emissions, welfare and permits price effects in KT-TCC and KT-TCCNK 
 
Source: elaborations on model results 
 
Table 5 – Share of emissions associated with leakage in the KT scenario (Mt of CO2) 
 
Source: elaborations on model results 
 
When  we  develop  a  comparison  of  domestic  output  and  imports  from  Non-Annex, 
considering now the results in the KT scenario as a baseline, Figure 3 shows that EU and 
US domestic production is hardly affected by the CBT when the domestic carbon content is 
considered  (KT-TCC).  On  the  other  hand,  both  countries  take  advantage  of  the  larger 
import reductions due to the higher tariffs justified by higher carbon content of Non-Annex 
countries (KT-TCCNK), especially in energy intensive sectors (see Table 7 for a comparison  
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of tariffs in ad valorem terms). 
 
Figure 3 – Changes in domestic output and imports from Non-Annex countries in KT-














Source: elaborations on model results 
 
In the second set of scenarios, carbon tariffs are endogenously determined in order to 
keep the overall production emissions in Non-Annex countries (scenario KT-LEAK) and the 
share of imports in total production in Annex I countries (scenario KT-COMP) unchanged. 
The KT-LEAK scenario guarantees the lowest rate of carbon leakage, although it should be 
noted that the problem is only halved since, for the reasons explained in Section 3.3, it 
cannot be eliminated. In particular, some countries, such as China, India, South Africa and 
Rest of Europe, substantially reduce their emissions, and the contraction of their industrial 
sector  is  associated  with  high  welfare  losses.  In  this  respect,  the  higher  tariffs  of  this 
scenario also lead to very large terms of trade gains for Annex I countries. On the other 
hand, the KT-COMP scenario, even if not explicitly focused on carbon leakage, still leads to 
a reduction which can be compared with those in the exogenous CBTs scenarios and the 
same is true for the welfare impacts (see Table 6 for a comparison of these two scenarios). 
In  line  with  previous  contributions  (Veenendaal  and  Manders,  2008),  our  findings 
confirm that for compliant countries, imposing a CBT is welfare improving with respect to a 
IET scenario with no carbon tariffs, but welfare gains are rather small, as acknowledged by 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2008), with the exception of the KT-LEAK scenario where terms 
of trade play a major role.
Looking at the relationship between output and import changes in the EU and the US, 
Figure 4 shows that the KT-LEAK scenario features larger reductions with respect to the 
KT scenario not only for imports, but also for domestic supply. It is also worth noting that 
in the KT-COMP scenario, imports decrease (still in comparison with the KT scenario) only  
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for some energy-intensive sectors and even increase in other cases, especially in the EU 
market. 
Table 6 – Emissions, welfare and permits price effects in KT-LEAK and KT-COMP 
 
Source: elaborations on model results 
 
Figure 4 – Changes in domestic output and imports from Non-Annex countries in KT-














Source: elaborations on model results 
 
If we look at the comparison between ad valorem carbon tariffs for alternative scenarios 
shown in Table 7, the most striking feature is that the carbon tariffs needed to significantly 
reduce  the  carbon  leakage  problem  (scenario  KT-LEAK)  are  much  higher  than  those 
currently  discussed  in  the  political  debate  (KT-TCC  and  KT-TCCNK  scenarios).  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  tariffs  aimed  at  keeping  the  share  of  imports  from  Non-Annex  
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countries constant show some spikes among the energy-intensive sectors. In the KT-TCC 
and KT-TCCNK scenarios, tariffs are increasing in sectoral carbon contents. With regard to 
Non-Annex countries and the variance of the tariffs they face, KT-TCCNK and KT-LEAK 
scenarios are characterized by higher variances in all sectors, and this explains the larger 
costs arising for Non-Annex countries. 
 
Table 7 – Ad valorem carbon tariffs for alternative scenarios§ 
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Source: elaborations on model results 
 
Finally,  we  simulate  a  cooperative  scenario  in  order  to  obtain  a  benchmark  for 
comparison with the other results (Table 8). The cooperative scenario solves (by definition) 
the  carbon  leakage  problem  since  Non-Annex  countries  are  committed  to  keeping  their 
emissions  constant  in  relation  to  the  2012  baseline.  Moreover,  in  this  scenario,  we  also 
register a much higher global emission reduction since all countries participate in emission 
trading and Non-Annex countries have lower abatement costs.   
 
Table 8 – Comparing results with a Cooperative solution* 
 
Source: elaborations on model results 
Note: * all figures for CO2 reduction and welfare effects refer to a global effect at the world level 
 
Looking at welfare changes for the world as a whole, our results clearly show that global 
welfare decreases when CBTs are introduced, as to be expected, due to the negative impacts 
on allocative efficiency (Table 9). 
The  cooperative  scenario  would  constitute  the  best  solution  since  welfare  changes, 
although still negative, are more than halved with respect to the scenario with emission  
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trading (KT) and almost five times smaller than the scenario designed to partially eliminate 
the carbon leakage through unilateral policies (KT-LEAK). Looking at the carbon emission 
permits  price  sheds  some  more  light  on  CBT  effects.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  all  scenarios 
featuring  CBTs  lead  to  an  increase,  albeit  rather  small,  in  this  price.  CBTs  protect  the 
domestic production of carbon intensive sectors, and this leads to more stringent climate 
policies to obtain a given emission target, thus resulting in higher emission prices and larger 
welfare losses. 
The distribution of welfare changes in the cooperative solution between Annex I and 
Non-Annex  countries  reveals  that  in  relation  to  the  KT  scenario,  Annex  I  countries 
significantly reduce their allocative efficiency losses: the price for that is the cost of the 
emission permits they need to buy on the market (Table 10). Non-Annex countries face 
opposite effects since they lose in terms of allocative efficiency but they gain as net sellers on 
the carbon market. More importantly, allocative efficiency gains (i.e., reduced losses) for 
Annex  I  countries  are  much  larger  than  the  allocative  efficiency  losses  for  Non-Annex 
countries. 
 
Table 9 – Welfare decomposition for all countries for the COOP scenario 
 
Source: elaborations on model results 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we propose alternative border tax adjustments for dealing with carbon leakage.  
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We simulate different scenarios to gain a better understanding of to what extent a border 
tax is effective in reducing the leakage rate, and if major differences emerge when alternative 
CBTs are modelled. More specifically, we are interested in investigating the impact in terms 
of leakage reduction and to what extent such trade policies are also a valid instrument for 
protecting the economic competitiveness of compliant countries in the international market. 
Our results confirm that the effectiveness of CBTs in reducing carbon leakage is limited 
and that they could even be damaging in terms of competitiveness. Moreover, border tariff 
adjustment  compatibility  with  WTO-rules  is  still  a  moot  point  and  justifying  them  by 
climate concerns could open the way to a proliferation of trade measures dealing with other 
areas where the competitive playing field is viewed as uneven. 
We also provide a comparison with a global cooperative scenario where all countries 
contribute to reducing GHG emissions. In the cooperative scenario all major greenhouse gas 
emitting countries such as US, China and India participate in emission reduction efforts. 
Non-Annex  countries  pledge  to  maintain  their  current  emission  levels  and  they  play  a 
relevant  role  in  the  attainment  of  emission  reduction  target  of  Annex  I  countries,  by 
participating in emission trading and offering cheap abatement opportunities. Our results 
suggest that the cooperative scenario would be preferable both in terms of welfare impacts 
and  efficiency  in  emission  reductions.  We  show  that  the  cooperative  solution  is  welfare 
improving with respect to all CBT forms, while gaining effectiveness in CO2 reduction. This 
last point suggests that the bargaining power exerted by Annex I countries in the Post-
Kyoto agreement should be directed towards a global solution rather than towards short-
sighted solutions in which a domestically-oriented point of view prevails losing effectiveness 
as well as economic convenience.  
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